MODEL OF A POST-QUANTUM PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE USING A QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR FOR AN AUTONOMOUS DIFFERENTIAL CORRECTION SYSTEM OF GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35546/kntu2078-4481.2025.4.3.27Keywords:
global navigation satellite system (GNSS); quantum random number generator (QRNG); cyberattack; cybersecurity; differential GNSS (DGNSS); public key infrastructure (PKI); Autonomous DGNSS; post-quantum cryptography (PQC)Abstract
In the article, a formalized model of a post-quantum public key infrastructure (PKI) for the information-and- communication system (ICS) of the Autonomous Differential GNSS System (Autonomous DGNSS) is proposed, constructed on the basis of the use of a quantum random number generator (QRNG) and the national cryptographic standards DSTU 7564:2014 (“Kupyna”), DSTU 7624:2014 (“Kalyna”), DSTU 8961:2019 (“Skelia”), and DSTU 9212:2023 (“Vershyna”). The relevance of the research is conditioned by the need to increase the cryptographic robustness of data-transmission channels between the control-and-correction stations (CCS) and the data-processing center of the Autonomous DGNSS, as well as by the increased requirements for the authenticity and integrity of correction data provided through the web service to interested users of the Autonomous DGNSS, particularly under post-quantum threats. The proposed PKI model ensures authentication of CCS and users, protection of tunnel channels, integrity of correction data, and trust in the server components of the Autonomous DGNSS by integrating quantum entropy into the processes of key generation and signing. The study substantiates the role of the QRNG as a source of high-quality entropy for constructing long-term key pairs according to the DSTU “Skelia” and “Vershyna” algorithms, as well as session keys of symmetric encryption under the DSTU “Kalyna” algorithm, and also develops a generalized PKI structure with a single Root CA and several Issuing CAs for the primary and backup data-processing centers. The proposed model defines the logical interaction of PKI components, tunneling mechanisms, signature and certificate-verification modules, and demonstrates the possibility of ensuring post-quantum resistance of the Autonomous DGNSS without changing its architecture. It is shown that the use of a QRNG in combination with national cryptographic algorithms makes it possible to minimize the risk of key compromise, increase resistance to quantum attacks, and ensure long-term cryptographic reliability of communication channels and the web service of the Autonomous DGNSS. The proposed methodology allows creating PKI for information-and-communication systems of differential correction and other segments of critical infrastructure with increased requirements for trust, integrity, and confidentiality of data, taking into account the requirements of modern cybersecurity standards (ISO/IEC 27001, NIST, ND TZI).
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